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I. Introduction
The post-1960s pattern of globalization changed the competitive dynamics of nations with the center of gravity in manufacturing production and exports shifting in favor of developing countries, and unprecedented economic growth rates in East Asia boosting the credibility of export-oriented industrialization as a winning development strategy. While the growth enhancing potential of reliance on restricted groups of not only primary, but also manufacturing, exports has been brought into question at several levels (Cline, 1982; Hunt and Tybout, 1998) , there is little disagreement about the fact that economic survival and competitive edge in a world of increasing segmentation of production and rapidly changing competitive dynamics can only be achieved via continuous technological upgrading and movement of producers up the international value chain (Gereffi, 1999; Hausmann et al., 2007) .
Although East Asian manufacturers have been successful in reaping the advantages of industrial production at several different skill levels and even moving towards original brand name manufacturing, Africa has lagged behind in its trade diversification efforts. Through the 1990s, 39 African countries depended for more than half of their export earnings on two primary commodities (Morrissey, 2005) .
National barriers in the form of poor business environment and infrastructure, on the one hand, and the international trade environment of barriers to trade and tariff escalations, on the other hand, have been cited as the two key culprits for failed diversification and technological upgrading (Collier and Venables, 2007; Morrissey, 2005) . The former set of barriers made it difficult for African countries to exploit the advantages of preferential trade arrangements. For example, the absence of complementary domestic reforms reduced the ability of African countries to gain from the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA), and only a few textile and apparel exporting countries benefited significantly from the preferential market 3 provisions of the African Growth Opportunity Act (Collier and Venables, 2007; Morris, 2006) .
Given that complex rules of origin tend to constrain the potential of African countries to expand and diversify their exports significantly through access to industrialized countries' markets and in products of potential comparative advantage (for example, garments) they face serious challenges from Southeast Asian producers, African countries are typically encouraged to explore the export diversification and economic growth potential of south-south cooperation. Indeed, south-south cooperation is one of the priority areas of the United Nations'
Development Cooperation Forum (DCF). Among the south-south cooperation venues, China's current engagement with Africa has received the largest degree of attention in both the popular and academic press. At the same time, interest has mostly centered on Chinese firms building infrastructure in Africa and ChinaAfrica's trade has largely been ignored.
In 2005 China provided duty-free access for 190 items from 25 least developed sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Three years later, duty-free access was extended to 454 items from 31 SSA LDCs. Consistent with the principle of non-interference governing China's foreign engagement and to south-south cooperation's core principle of mutually beneficial exchange, 1 preferential market access is not conditioned on institutional reform and is extended to all least developed SSA countries with which China has diplomatic relations. 1 Participant countries at the 2010 DCF broadly agree that "South-South cooperation has features that set it apart from North-South cooperation, such as absence of conditionality, horizontal relationships and complementarity between parties as well as cost effectiveness." ECOSOC (2010, p. 7) 2 This distinguishes China's preferential market access program from the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA, 2000) which provides duty-free access to US imports of more than 6,400 items from eligible SSA countries until September 30, 2015, but is tied to countries' progress toward a more market-oriented economy, efforts to fight corruption, and other criteria.
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The key question we explore is whether preferential access to the Chinese market had significant impact on China's imports from Africa. Because China's preferential market access program is relatively new, this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first contribution in this area. More importantly, we move a step forward and address the important issue of whether the preferential trade arrangement with China provides any growth enhancing export diversification opportunities or whether it further entraps SSA countries in a selected number of primary export categories.
It is difficult to provide a clear ex-ante answer to these questions. On the one hand, the complementary export structures of the two sets of countries, with
Africa's comparative advantage in primary resources and China's comparative advantage in manufacturing products, gives good grounds for successful trade relations, though ones potentially further entrapping Africa into reliance on primary exports (Jenkins and Edwards, 2006; DFID, 2005) . On the other hand, movement of China up the international value chain (Rodrik, 2006) , opens new opportunities for export diversification and growth of Africa in a fashion similar to that of the "flying geese phenomenon" in East Asia, whereby technological upgrading of more advanced countries such as Japan and South Korea opened export diversification and technological upgrading opportunities to their Southeast Asian trade and production partners (Yusuf et al., 2003) . 
9 where asterisks indicate de-meaned variables and their corresponding coefficients.
The coefficient of the de-meaned triple interaction terms is positive if the preferential market access program is successful in increasing Chinese imports of preference-eligible product p from a preference-eligible country c when the preference program is in effect in period t.
It is important to note that zeroes are retained in all the estimations as "observed zeros contain valuable information which should be exploited" (Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006, p. 644) . Following common practice (see e.g. Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006; Eichengreen and Irwin, 1995) , import data are 
B. Export Diversification and Moving up the Value Chain
We follow the same methodological route to answer the question of whether trade between China and sub-Saharan Africa, after the preferential trade arrangement, improves the export sophistication and diversification potential of the African partners or whether it further entraps them into primary resource-based production and exports. Given that variation in this case is only along the country and period dimensions, we only include the interaction terms between i.country and i.prd in the following fixed effects model:
where EXPYct is the export sophistication index, which has now become stylized in the literature (Rodrik, 2006; Hausmann, et al.,2007 and Xu, 2010) . 8 The matrix Z 8 For any given period t, EXPYct is defined as 10 includes countries' real per capita GDP, population (proxy for country size), and rule of law while PDUM includes a set of period indicators. 9 The inclusion of controls over and above the interaction terms between i.country and i.prd is consistent with Hausmann et al (2007) . We use the same model to study the product concentration (HHIct) of countries' export bundle.
10

IV. TRADE GROWTH IMPLICATIONS OF THE PREFERENTIAL TRADE ARRANGEMENT
A. Empirical Results
We start our empirical analysis by first looking at the trade growth implications of the preferential trade arrangement. The estimates of equation (2) where spct is the share of product p in country c's exports, Pt is the set of all products exported by country c, and PRODpt measures the sophistication of product p in period t. A product's sophistication is weighted by the income of all countries exporting the good to China and is calculated as:
where Cpt is the set of all countries that export product p and PCYit is the real per capita income of country i in period t. The key idea behind the EXPYct index is that higher income countries export more sophisticated products. Thus, an increase in EXPYct over time indicates increasing sophistication in country c's exports to China. 9 To include a full set of period dummies, only countries with complete data for all nine years (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) where IMPct is China's total imports from country c in period t and IMPcpt is China's import of product p from country c in period t. HHIct falls between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating that all imports from country c in period t is in one product.
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are reported in Table 3 . The first two rows of Table 3 contain the estimated triple interaction terms for Phases I and II of China's preferential market access program for SSA LDCs with estimations performed for the sample as a whole (column (1)) as well as for the samples of middle and low income (column (2)) and low income countries (column (3)). Both coefficient estimates are negative and statistically significant with p-values < 0.01 regardless of whether the control group consists of all countries, middle and low income countries, or only low income countries. The coefficient estimates are larger in magnitude when the control group consists of middle and low income countries than low income countries alone, possibly indicating that preference-eligible SSA countries find it more difficult to compete with middle income than low income countries.
Table 3 here
The results above mask potential differences across product groups; thus, we repeat the exercise by replacing the triple interaction terms in equation (2) with five sets of triple interaction terms, one for each product group. 11 The coefficient estimates, which are also highlighted in Table 3 , show heterogeneity in the trade effects across both product and control groups.
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Consider the estimates for the full sample, column (1). We see that for both phases of the program, the triple interaction coefficients are negative in the case of 12 We also estimate a linear probability version of equation (2) 
B. Discussion and Potential Explanations
Our estimates indicate that except for the category of Other Primary Products, the preferential trade arrangement failed to contribute to the expansion of China's imports from SSA countries included in the program. We consider several 13 It is possible that the trade increasing effect of the preference program depends on the MFN duty rates of the products included on the preferential list. On average, the preference margin enjoyed by the preference-eligible SSA countries compared to other exporters of the same products to China is 10%, see Table 1 . Following Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) , we multiply the triple interaction terms in equation (2) with MFN duty rate categories as follows: category 1 is 0 ≤ MFN < 5%; category 2 is 5 ≤ MFN < 10%; category 3 is 10 ≤ MFN < 15%; category 4 is MFN ≥ 15%. For the most part, we obtain negative coefficients for the interactions between the MFN duty categories and the triple interaction terms except for Other Primary Products. This means that the preference margins enjoyed by the preference-eligible SSA countries matter only in this product group. This margin effect, however, disappears when these countries are compared to other low income countries.
13 possible explanations of this rather counter intuitive finding. On the one hand, it is possible that political economy considerations led to the inclusion in the preference list of products in which entitled countries did not have expansion potential, possibly on account of the fact that they were perceived as a competitive threat to Chinese products. Alternatively, it is possible that despite the preferences granted, SSA countries lack the capacity to compete against alternative exporters to the Chinese market. In the context of our model, the negative triple interaction term could for instance capture a situation whereby the Chinese imports from countries not included in the list and products not included in the list expanded faster during the preference periods than those included in the preference list.
We start by exploring the determinants of a product's inclusion on China's preferential list. We argue that a product might have been selected if local (Chinese) competition is either non-existent or small, and/or the anticipated export increasing effect from the SSA countries is negligible. We use trade-based revealed comparative advantage (RCA) as a proxy for the presence of local competition. Political economy concerns explain the product inclusion choice if the probability of inclusion decreases with China's RCA and with SSA's RCA in these products. Positive coefficients for both RCA indices suggest that product inclusion choice is less likely due to political economy considerations. We estimate the following probit model to test these hypotheses:
,
14 where i.product = 1, if product p is included in the preference list at period t, equal to zero otherwise; CHRCApt-1 and SSARCApt-1 are respectively China's and preference-receiving countries' revealed comparative advantages in product p preprogram (2002) (2003) (2004) . We also include a set of qualitative indicators to differentiate major product groups' probability of inclusion with Other Primary Products as reference group. We estimate equation (4) for Phases I and II of China's preferential market access program.
The probit regression estimates are reported in Table 4 Interestingly, the probability of inclusion of Textile and Apparel products is higher relative to the reference group in Phase II of the preference program. Altogether these results do not grant obvious support to the hypothesis that product inclusion was driven by political economy concerns on China's part, although in general there appears to be certain preference for including Other Primary Products more than other product categories.
Table 4 here
Next we turn towards our alternative hypothesis related to capacity constraints for SSA beneficiaries from the preferential arrangement to expand their exports to China. To begin with, in Table 3 , whereby preference-eligible products and countries experienced an obviously higher growth rates only in the Other Primary Products category. Table 5 here Note that China's imports of some items on the preference list also declined. to this product group. About 106 non-preferential product items experienced a shift from zero to positive Chinese imports during the preference period with a combined value of US$15.7 million while no item on the preference list in this product group went from zero to positive. Overall, these results reveal a mixed picture, though not one supporting explicitly the view that increasing exports from zero to a large 17 positive number appears to be easy or that growth rates of preference-eligible exports to the Chinese market dominate preference-ineligible products. Table 7 contains the triple interaction terms for these cases. 
V. Export Diversification and Movement up the Value Chain
So far, we found that except for a few product categories, most notably
Other Primary Products China's preferential market access program has not had the intended effect of increasing imports from low income SSA countries included in the preferential arrangement. Our descriptive statistics in Figures 1 and 2 further indicate that, compared to non-preference countries, preference eligible countries' export bundle is less sophisticated and more concentrated. However, there is some indication that the export bundle of some preference-eligible SSA countries to China has increased in sophistication and has become less concentrated since the start of China's preferential market access program in 2005 (See Figure 3) . Table 8 contains the estimates of countries' export sophistication and concentration indices against the country-time interaction terms and various country characteristics using three different specifications in each of the two cases.
Figures 1-3 here
All else equal, there is no change in the sophistication of preference-eligible SSA countries' export bundle to China during the preference period as both interaction terms are insignificant at the 5% level of significance in all three specifications.
However, these interaction terms are statistically significant with a negative sign in the export concentration regressions. This means that the export bundles of the preference-eligible countries have become less concentrated during the preference period.
Table 8 here
Individual countries' experiences are obviously heterogeneous. In Table 9 we highlight the shares of China's imports from preference-eligible SSA countries.
Take for instance Angola and Sudan, the countries with the largest shares of China's imports both overall and of non-preferential products. These large shares are explained by the disproportionately high imports of crude petroleum, which although not included in the preference list, do enter duty-free. This is also consistent with the insignificant changes in product concentration and zero-tonegative changes in these two countries' export sophistications. In sum, while preferential trade arrangement increased the potential of preference-eligible SSA countries to diversify their export basket (Table 8) , it did not lead to a dramatic improvement of their comparative advantage vis-à-vis comparable middle and low income countries and did not result in a dramatic overall increase of aggregate exports to China (Table 3) . A possible explanation is the persistent legacy of primary exports of either non-eligible products such as oil (as in Angola and Sudan). We do find indications that preference-eligible countries experienced larger diversification and sophistication of their export baskets ( Figure   3 ), though with certain exceptions as in the case of Ethiopia, whose share of preference-eligible products increased, but the diversification and sophistication of its export basket to China went down. While our regression analysis indicates that (on average) the preference program contributed to greater diversification, we do not find a significant impact of the program on sophistication.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In 2005 China provided preferential market access to 190 items from 25 least developed sub-Saharan African countries. Three years later, duty-free access was extended to 454 items from 31 SSA LDCs. In this paper, we explore the ability of preference-eligible countries to benefit from the preferential trade arrangement by looking at their export expansion to China, as well as at the concentration and sophistication of their export baskets. There is no convincing evidence that the 21 preferential trade arrangement has helped preference-eligible countries gain competitive edge over other exporters into the Chinese market. A plausible explanation is the existence of capacity constraints that prevent African countries from benefiting significantly from the preferential arrangement. We do find that the export baskets of preference eligible countries have become in general less concentrated and more sophisticated, although we do not find statistically significant association between the increase in sophistication and the inclusion of the country in the preference arrangement. The effect of the preferential program on individual countries is heterogeneous, with countries such as the DRC and Zambia benefiting in terms of both diversification and sophistication, less so in the case of Zambia, which experienced some degree of sophistication even prior to the program, while countries like Ethiopia experienced a decrease in diversification and sophistication and others (namely Angola and Sudan) were never able to diversify out of selected primary product exports. (2002-2004 to 2005-2007) Growth Rate (2002-2004 to 2008-2010) Product Group All Products (2002-2004; 2005-2007; 2008-2010) . -year periods (2002-2004; 2005-2007; 2008-2010) . 846,233 Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors allowing for within six-digit HS product group correlation. ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
